The analysis and defence of democracy on the grounds of its epistemic powers is now a well-established, if contentious, area of theoretical and empirical research. This article reconstructs a distinctive and systematic epistemic account of democracy from Dewey's writings. Running like a thread through this account is a critical analysis of the distortion of hierarchy and class division on social knowledge, which Dewey believes democracy can counteract. The article goes on to argue that DeweyÕs account has the resources to defuse at least some important forms of the broader charges of instrumentalism and depoliticization that are directed at the epistemic project. The gloomy conviction of the stratified character of capitalist societies and the conflictual character of their politics shapes DeweyÕs view of political agency, and this article outlines how this epistemic conception of democracy is deployed as a critical standard for judging and transforming existing political forms but also serves as a line of defence for democratic political forms against violent and authoritarian alternatives.
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Does Dewey have an Òepistemic argumentÓ for democracy? I. Introduction
The analysis and defence of democracy on the grounds of its epistemic powers is now a wellestablished, if contentious, area of theoretical and empirical research.
1 Epistemic democrats have developed a cluster of arguments to the effect that the wisdom of the many can be mobilized by democratic arrangements and that this provides an important defence of democracy.
Within democratic theory, a host of democratic skeptics has unsurprisingly descended on this idea, in a broad coalition that encompasses followers of both Arendt and Rawls Ð with critics argue, as Nadia Urbinati puts it, that epistemic democracy aspires to Òobjective standards for the evaluation of social choices that are above political communication and its proceduresÓ. 2 In doing so, it offers Òa radical attempt to depoliticize democracy by making it a chapter in the search for truthÓ. A first question is how an instrumental justification of democratic institutions in terms of epistemic capacity sits alongside a non-instrumental justification of (for example) procedural equality, or an instrumental justification in terms of some other value such as autonomy. 3 Does the former imply that the latter is only instrumentally justified Ð that citizens have political rights only since they can contribute to epistemically superior decisions? In spite of the expressed intentions of proponents of the epistemic conception, critics fear that epistemic democracy itself promotes a technocratic mentality. Plenty of us have doubts about the epistemic capacities of many citizens. We may even scoff at them; that is, at each other. This seems to be part and parcel of a democratic society. If democracy is valued only instrumentally for producing superior epistemic outcomes, these doubts open up space for opponents to mount a case for non-democratic forms of rule on the back of criticisms of the cognitive powers of voters and democratic systems. 4 Furthermore, to its critics the epistemic conception of democracy suggests an unrealistically cerebral view of politics as a quest to promote the ÒGNT, the gross national truthÓ, in one sardonic formulation, which glosses over the passionate assertion of antagonistic claims by different classes, interest groups, identities and ideologies.
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John DeweyÕs thought seems to provide a rich set of potential resources for the epistemic democrat. He tells us, for example, that:
The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities of human nature; faith in human intelligence, and in the power of pooled and cooperative experience. It is not belief that these things are complete but that if given a show they will grow and be able to generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective action. 6 However, the contours of DeweyÕs epistemic account, along with the question of whether there is an argument of this sort at all in his work, and its implications (if he does have one)
remain contested. For some interpreters, elements of DeweyÕs work support a view of democracy as a collective exercise in practical intelligence, although this is characterized in a variety of ways. 7 According to James Kloppenberg, for instance, DeweyÕs Òdemocratic community replicates the community of broadly conceived scientific inquiry that serves as the prototype of instrumental reasoningÓ. 8 
Hilary and Ruth Anna Putnam identify DeweyÕs
Òepistemological justification of democracyÓ, in which democracy is Òthe precondition for the full application of intelligence to the solution of social problemsÓ. 9 Elizabeth AndersonÕs influential account of the epistemic powers of democracy springs from the belief that ÒDeweyÕs experimentalist account of democracy as the collective exercise of practical intelligence offers rich resources for evaluating the epistemic powers of particular democratic institutions, and for suggesting reforms to improve these powersÓ, particularly in the value it attaches to the importance of diversity and challenge in improving social knowledge. show consists of four claims in a distinctive nested structure. Running like a thread through the epistemic accounts is a critical analysis of the distortion of hierarchy and class division on social knowledge, which democracy can counteract. Understanding this structure allows us (in section III) to see the shape of a Deweyan response to contemporary concerns about an epistemic approach to democracy, partly through an understanding of the relationship between the apparently divergent epistemic and ÒcontentiousÓ strands in his thought. The want to show how the succession of claims here is cumulative, in the sense that the later claims (in my presentation) include the earlier ones. These points also fit together, IÕll try to show, as different components in his overall naturalized picture of inquiry.
I also want to show how each of these claims deploys a slightly different conception of democracy. DeweyÕs conception of democracy is notoriously idiosyncratic. While it is commonplace to think of Dewey as distinctively the theorist of democracy as Òmore than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experienceÓ, this idea takes different forms in different places in his democratic thinking. Further, while Dewey refers rather scathingly in contrast to a conception of democracy as mere ÒmachineryÓ for decision-making, he is committed to improving this machinery rather than merely dismissing it as unimportant. The real target of his ire is the identification of democracy exclusively with a current set of political institutions, particularly only with elections and majority rule. He thinks that this contains an inbuilt conservative bias that prevents more imaginative institutional thinking: indeed, subverting an assumption commonly attributed to him, he says that the Òold sayingÓ that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy is Ònot aptÓ if by this is meant introducing more machinery of the same kind that already exists.
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[i] Pragmatic self-contradiction. The most prominent example of this line of thought is
DeweyÕs argument in The Public and Its Problems against Walter LippmannÕs defence of
Òthe responsible administratorÓ as epistemically superior to the befuddled general citizen.
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Against this, Dewey argues that the claim for the epistemic superiority of an expert class, when it is closed off from contestation and correction through democratic debate, is selfdefeating: Òin the absence of an articulate voice on the part of the masses, the best do not and cannot remain the best, the wise cease to be wise É In the degree to which they become a specialized class, they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serveÓ. So the merit of even the existing ÒrudimentaryÓ form of democracy is that it Òcompels É recourse to methods of discussion, consultation and persuasionÓ, and in doing so provides the opportunity to improve decisions.
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The epistemic standards that purportedly govern a technocratic eliteÕs epistemic mission are in pragmatic conflict with the exclusion of those whose needs they are supposed to serve. To the extent that epistemically superior outcomes tend to emerge from processes of open and inclusive challenge, discussion and consultation, an epistemic elite needs to bind itself to these processes. And democracy provides the best institutional conditions for this, through institutionalizing Òeffective guarantees of free inquiry, free assembly and free communicationÓ as well as ways of holding rulers to account and of informing them of their mistakes.
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Although well-known, this argument has a relatively narrow scope. It appeals only to the Òresponsible administratorÓ seeking to benefit from democratic engagement in allowing her to achieve self-avowed goals of understanding public needs. The end-in-view, knowledge of public needs, canÕt be achieved without engagement and participation of those whose needs are at issue. So this first line of argument isnÕt intended for a person or institution lacking a commitment to these goals. It is also worth noting that this is only an instrumental defence of democracy in its ÒmachineÓ sense: political machinery has a value since it fosters consultation and debate, which in turn allows for the expression of wider public interests.
[ since it focuses not only on a self-proclaimed epistemic eliteÕs claim to technical authority but on social privilege and disadvantage more generally. The claim here is not only that one group fails to meet its own epistemic standards but that the worldview of different classes is distorted, irrespective of how it views its own epistemic mission; that this distortion stems from the power relations and related inequalities of distribution among these classes; and that democracy, in DeweyÕs sense, counters this distortion.
Dewey presents some different reasons for this conclusion. One is that absence of Òfree and full intercourseÓ limits experience and opportunities to learn from one another. suggest that this isnÕt his view. The claim about the epistemic distortions of hierarchy and privilege need to be seen as nested in his wider conception of inquiry and democratic interaction.
[iii] Democratic conditions of inquiry. ÒThe very heart of political democracy is adjudication of social differences by discussion and exchange of viewsÓ, Dewey writes in a late essay.
ÒThis method provides a rough approximation to the method of effecting change by means of experimental inquiry and testÓ. 33 To understand the force and scope of this claim, we need to sketch out some key features of DeweyÕs conception of experimental inquiry. These are [1] In inquiry, we aim to solve problems.
[2] To be successful, this should be done experimentally.
[3] Conducting inquiry experimentally requires democracy, in his sense.
[4] So there is a reason to support democracy, grounded in the conditions for successful inquiry.
Let me consider these points in more detail, particularly the third.
Regarding [1], DeweyÕs basic move is to see our important epistemic relationship to the world as inquiry, and to view inquiry as a form of action or practice carried out by an agent. 34 We engage in inquiry as part of an existential struggle to cope with a precarious but improvable environment. Experience flows until a problematic situation is encountered or identified: then ideas, experiments, and the obstacle circumvented or direction changed.
Inquiry is demanded by what he calls an incomplete situation; that is, one in which something must be done, as a response to precarious, unstable and uncertain conditions: Òwe are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtfulÓ. 35 Inquiry is needed in order to define the specific problem that the situation presents and to re-establish in accordance with human purposes the provisional equilibrium which earlier held. Accordingly, he defines it as a practical project, Òthe controlled and directed transformation of an indeterminate situation be appraised by assessing the extent to which it solves the problem.
Turning to [2] , DeweyÕs key claim is that success in inquiry requires a radical openness on the part of inquirers. We hold some presuppositions of inquiry Ð methods, practices, standards Ð fixed in order to identify a problem and arrive at a determinate solution.
But inquiry requires a thoroughgoing fallibilism, a preparedness to consider reasons for and against any belief or presupposition. A constitutive condition of inquiry from this pragmatist perspective is the openness of its claims and standards to testing against experience:
Ò[a]dherence to any body of doctrines and dogmas based upon a specific authority signifies distrust in the power of experience to provide, in its own ongoing movement, the needed principles of belief and actionÓ.
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For Dewey, then, the step to [3] rests on identifying this openness with a conception of democracy: Ò[d]emocracy is the faith that the process of experience is more important than any special result attained, so that special results achieved are only of ultimate value as they are used to enrich and order the ongoing processÓ. 38 In this sense, democracy is understood as consisting in and as providing the conditions for experimental inquiry. Robust inquiry requires that we must have access to evidence, arguments, other forms of information, and processes of reason-exchange. If we want our inquiry to be successful, we should not
prejudge its outcomes, by excluding sources of experience that allow us to explore and correct our hypotheses. By contrast:
Every authoritarian scheme, on the contrary, assumes that its value may be assessed by some prior principle, if not of family and birth or race and color or possession of material wealth, then by the position and rank the person occupies in the existing social scheme. The democratic faith in equality is the faith that each individual shall have the chance and opportunity to contribute whatever he is capable of contributing, and that the value of his contribution be decided by its place and function in the organized total of similar contributions: --not on the basis of prior status of any kind whatever.
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Social and political values are themselves not fixed standards but revisable hypotheses, the implications of which are worked through in practice and which are judged in the light of their consequences in the widest sense for everyone involved. In order to identify and solve problems we need to have in place the conditions for problem-solving. Democratic institutions and culture, including security of a range of individual rights for all, provide the best social conditions for this, because at least in principle they allow for openness, epistemic diversity, experiment, contestation and revision. 40 Hierarchy and snobbery undermine this constitutive commitment to openness, like epistemological fixity, since they prejudice thinking about social problems.
ItÕs an important feature of DeweyÕs thinking here that this conception of inquiry doesnÕt assume that there is a determinate solution available in all cases. 41 Indeed, he highlights differences of opinion as well as conflicts of interest and value pluralism as [iv] The democratic ideal. This fourth step is rooted in what Dewey calls an ÒidealÓ conception of democracy as self-rule. He often refers to this as an ideal or generic idea of democracy. Dewey thinks of the democrat, in this sense, as hypothesizing that individual self-development and collective self-determination go together, and using this as a critical standard to appraise social and political conditions: Òfrom an ethical point of viewÓ, Dewey says, Òthe democratic ideal poses, rather than solves, the great problem: How to harmonize the development of each individual with the maintenance of a social state in which the activities of one will contribute to the good of all the othersÓ. 44 An ideal, in DeweyÕs sense, is a hypothesis formed in non-ideal circumstances which suggests possibilities for action and for how our values may relate to one another. Ideals set out ÒvisionsÓ, understood as possibilities to be experimentally tested and explored, but they do not specify the specific Blocking some people from inclusion on equal terms is not only (as in [i] ) the cause of epistemic failure, standing in the way of accessing a procedure-independent interest. It is also constitutive of that blockage, since it subverts the possibility of participation on democratic terms, and in doing so frustrates access to the common regard that is needed for my self-development on these terms. 48 Epistemic inclusion is a condition of democratic Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 348. 46 Ibid., pp. 348-9; cf. Dewey, Public, 47 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 329; Dewey, Democracy and Education, p. 98. 48 ÒThere is a moral tragedy inherent in efforts to further the common good which prevent the result from being either good or common Ð not good, because it is at the expense of the active participation and so part of the democratic ideal, in DeweyÕs sense.
The claim that self-development in the relevant sense is important and that this common regard is necessary for it is open to a well-known ethical challenge to this kind of approach: why does my self-development require this? Why canÕt it be at the expense of others? There is certainly some evidence to support an interpretation of Dewey as rather bluntly stipulating that individual ÒgrowthÓ is somehow lacking or stunted in the absence of this common concern. So, for example, he says that Òa member of a robber band may express his powers in a way consonant with belonging to that group and be directed by the interest common to its members. But he does so only at the cost of repression of those of his potentialities which can be realized only through membership in other groupsÓ. 49 Now
Dewey here isnÕt just helping himself to a moralized conception of self-development. He doesnÕt imagine that the idea of self-development at the expense of others is nonsensical:
hat a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as a gangster, as a corrupt politician cannot be doubtedÓ. 50 Rather, his point is that forms of self-development that exclude or oppress others conflict with the democratic ideal: the Deweyan conception of individual growth in democratic society doesnÕt aspire to be ethically neutral but is framed within the terms of this ideal. If I assert that engaging with others on terms of equality is repugnant to my own goals and values (or frustrates my capacities as a corrupt politician or gangster), Dewey isnÕt
growth of those to be helped, and not common because these have no share in bringing the result about. The social welfare can be advanced only by means which enlist the positive interest and active energy of those to be benefitted or ÒimprovedÓ . . . [W]ithout active cooperation both in forming aims and in carrying them out there is no possibility of a common goodÓ (Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 347 seeking to show that from some ethically neutral standpoint my capacities are better served by my adopting a democratic view of self-development.
III. Instrumentalism and depoliticization
With this understanding of the structure of DeweyÕs epistemic claims about democracy in place, I want to turn to the resources that he gives us to understand and address the more general concerns about an epistemic approach to democracy, focusing on the two challenges of instrumentalism and depoliticization directed at epistemic accounts by democratic critics.
First, the exclusive concern with the epistemic quality of decisions means that democratic procedures are valued only instrumentally as mechanisms for achieving this outcome. However, we value democratic participation for other reasons too: as a noninstrumental expression of equal respect or as instrumental for achieving other values (e.g., autonomy, individual welfare). The demands of an epistemic conception of democracy clash with those of other conceptions and have perverse anti-democratic consequences. For example, if democracy is viewed as having at its core a commitment to equal respect for each citizen, this seems to conflict with the requirements of a search for truth, which may call for deference to the superior knowledge of experts. 51 These undemocratic implications make the account of democratic decision-making politically vulnerable in principle to a technocratic move: privileging the value of the ÒcorrectnessÓ of the outputs of decisions can provide grounds to exclude some citizens from input into decisions if it is judged that their participation may dilute the epistemic quality of the decisions. showing the residual benefits of democratic Òpolitical machineryÓ for keeping technocrats in line. It is misleading to look at this in isolation as it should be seen as embedded in the wider John Dewey, Theory of Valuation, in Later Works, vol. 13, ed. Boydston, . Dewey wants to show how any move to a knowledge hierarchy is selfsubverting [ii] , that aspirations to inquiry contain a constitutive democratic element in his sense [iii] , and that self-government on democratic terms requires epistemic inclusion.
The other objection to epistemic democracy that I want to consider is that it depoliticizes democracy. From this perspective, to view democracy as a form of social inquiry or a collective effort intelligently to address social problems glosses over democratic politics as a site of power, contention, resistance and conflicting interests and identities. This, as weÕve seen, is also a well-established line of criticism of Deweyan democracy. Now for Dewey existing democratic societies are not communities of inquiry.
Democratic politics is not pictured as eliminating conflict but as a space in which conflicts can be discussed and resolved: ÒOf course, there are conflicting interests; otherwise there would be no social problems [É] The method of democracy Ð inasfar as it is that of organized intelligence Ð is to bring these conflicts out into the open where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests than are represented by either of them separatelyÓ. 54 This is not a given state of affairs but one that needs to be continually fought for in the face of opposition: Òthe struggle for democracy has to be maintained on as many fronts as culture has aspects: political, economic, international, educational, scientific, and artistic, religiousÓ.
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Furthermore, as noted above, a number of commentators have drawn attention to DeweyÕs support for more radical forms of democratic participation and action, including his activities Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, in Later Works, vol. 11, p. 56 (emphasis in original Rounding out our picture of DeweyÕs conception of politics in this way doesnÕt in itself address the objection to an epistemic view of democracy, of course, but only pushes the Here I want to explore one important systematic way of identifying and addressing this apparent dissonance, for the light it sheds on DeweyÕs account. LetÕs start by considering
Marc StearsÕs argument that we can reconcile these two views of democratic politics through distinguishing non-ideal and ideal theory Ð between whatÕs required as a tactical and political matter to achieve the conditions for social inquiry and a moral ideal of social and political inquiry in ideal conditions. Dewey Òseparated the long-term goal of a communicative democracy Ð to which he remained resolutely committed Ð from a short-term political strategy suitable for a Depression-era America that emphasized a series of distinctly nondeliberative approaches to the ongoing struggleÓ. At a non-ideal level, democrats should be concerned with establishing the conditions for a well-functioning democracy: but this may involve Òadversarial, manipulative, and even coerciveÓ action. Òcoercive means can serve democratic ends when they are used to provoke rather than resolve democratic inquiry in the face of habits, ideologies, and institutions obstructing the publicÕs inquiry into its problemsÓ.
As weÕve seen in relation to argument [iv] There is an undoubted objective clash of interests between finance-capitalism that controls the means of production and whose profit is served by maintaining relative ÒexperimentalistÓ is one who would see to it that the method depended upon by all in some degree in every democratic community be followed through to completion.
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The contribution of experimentalism is epistemic, the discovery and expression of the dominant social interest, but doesnÕt in itself resolve the clash of interests. This end-in-view, though, is a means to a further end, keeping politics political, as it were Ð it stops politics sliding into mere violence or coercion. Of course, there are no guarantees of success in this, nor is it the case that violence and coercion can always be avoided. But itÕs important that
Dewey sees experimentalism as a bulwark against the collapse of political relationships into authoritarianism, dogma and violence.
IV. Conclusions
In the light of recent debates, IÕve argued that a systematic epistemic account of democracy can be reconstructed from DeweyÕs writings, with a distinctive nested structure. last point is worth emphasizing, as it suggests we should be cautious about trying to extract
Òlessons from DeweyÓ to address contemporary theoretical problems, while glossing over the wider commitments that support his position. The genealogy of epistemic democracy may be stranger Ð or at least less familiar Ð as well as richer, than its contemporary proponents and detractors maintain.
